BERKELEY TEACH-IN: VIETNAM

VOICES AND DOCUMENTS
Recorded at the Berkeley Campus of the University of California by Radio Station KPFA
EDITED, COMPILLED AND ANNOTATED BY LOUIS MENASHE

THE VOICES OF:
STAUGHTON LYND / AARON WILDAVSKY / ROBERT SCHEER / PAUL POTTER / PAUL KRASSNER / BOB PARRIS
DR. BENJAMIN SPOCK / I. F. STONE / M. S. AR nonI / NORMAN MAILER / MARIO SAVIO / DICK GREGORY
SENATOR ERNEST GRUENING / ISAAC DEUTSCHER

FOLKWAYS RECORDS FD 5765
Professor Staughton Lynd
Professor Aaron Wildavsky
Robert Scheer
Paul Potter
Paul Krassner
Bob Parris
Dr. Benjamin Spock
L.F. Stone
M.S. Armoni
Norman Mailer
Mario Savio
Dick Gregory
Senator Ernest Gruening
Isaac Deutscher

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DESCRIPTIVE NOTES ARE INSIDE POCKET

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BERKELEY TEACH-IN:
VIETNAM

Edited, compiled and annotated
by Louis Menashe

I. TEN THESES ON THE TEACH-INS

1. The teach-ins were not conceived as ordinary forums where the case for each side might be aired but as platforms of informed and coherent protest at a time when one side (the government's) virtually monopolized the flow of information to the public and when the limits of acceptable opposition in the press and in congress were drawing too narrow.

2. The teach-ins were part of the process of breakdown of government credibility. Americans reacted with anger and humiliation to the cover stories and managed news reports connected with such episodes as the U-2 incident of 1960, the Cuban invasion of 1961, and (while the teach-ins were in progress) the Dominican intervention of April, 1965. The continuous stream of misinformation on Vietnam -- on the supposed stability and successes of the Saigon regime, on the efficiency of "pacification" programs in the Vietnamese countryside, on the origins and nature of the guerrillas (V.N.Cong) and the degree of North Vietnamese or Russian or Chinese involvement -- proved too much for large sections of the American public to bear. "I was upset at the bombing of the North," said someone at the University of Michigan teach-in, "but when they came out with that White Paper (the State Department's Aggression from the North: The Record of North Viet-Nam's Campaign To Conquer South Viet-Nam, February, 1965 -- ed.), which was an absolute insult to my intelligence and that of the whole country -- that's when I really got mad." Almost at once the teach-ins became the nemesis of the latest government communiqué. Students and teachers probed the history of the war, dissected official policy statements and discarded them wholesale. The State Department finally evinced enough concern to dispatch "truth teams" to various campuses. Such teams, and defenders of government policy in general, were not too kindly received at teach-ins and often badly mauld in confrontation with debaters and audiences. No one who has participated in a teach-in can ever forget the profound curiosity and alertness, the educated skepticism, and the familiarity with the relevant data displayed by American college students on the subject of Vietnam. Any government supporter had to think twice before uttering a cold-war cliche or stating something of dubious factual support.

3. The content of speeches and discussion at the teach-ins reveals a marked decay in the cold-war attitudes which had characterized the political positions of students and teachers a decade ago. This is significant inasmuch as government policy in Vietnam represents no radically new departure from the general line of global anti-communism adopted after the Second World War. Any action undertaken abroad in the name of anti-communism was likely to receive blanket endorsement at home. Such endorsement is not so easily come by today. This generation is seeking a better understanding of the life and aspirations of peoples abroad; it shows signs of being prepared to accept the legitimacy of left-wing movements as inevitable internal offshoots of nationalist and anti-colonialist struggles in Asia, Africa, and Latin America; it questions the assumption that such movements necessarily pose a threat to the national security of this country. In regard to Vietnam, such thinking has led to a re-examination of a subject previously considered taboo; breaking the curtain of ignorance about China and recognizing the need to make some kind of peaceful contact with her; speaker after teach-in speaker (especially at Berkeley) raised this issue as a necessary corollary to the question of Vietnam. The government, on the other hand, has been trying to revitalize the old attitudes by transferring intact to Asia the political rhetoric and strategy once applied to Eastern Europe; for the object of "containment," "roll-back," and "encirclement," now read China instead of the Soviet Union; for the source of "international communism," "wars of national liberation," "aggression," and "subversion," now read Peking instead of Moscow. The men who think they successfully executed this policy in Eastern Europe are often the same men who are formulating strategy for Asia today. The teach-ins demonstrate that the passive acceptance of such policies on the part of an influential sector of the American public may be at an end.

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5. The content of speeches and discussion at the teach-ins reveals a marked decay in the cold-war attitudes which had characterized the political positions of students and teachers a decade ago. This is significant inasmuch as government policy in Vietnam represents no radically new departure from the general line of global anti-communism adopted after the Second World War. Any action undertaken abroad in the name of anti-communism was likely to receive blanket endorsement at home. Such endorsement is not so easily come by today. This generation is seeking a better understanding of the life and aspirations of peoples abroad; it shows signs of being prepared to accept the legitimacy of left-wing movements as inevitable internal offshoots of nationalist and anti-colonialist struggles in Asia, Africa, and Latin America; it questions the assumption that such movements necessarily pose a threat to the national security of this country. In regard to Vietnam, such thinking has led to a re-examination of a subject previously considered taboo; breaking the curtain of ignorance about China and recognizing the need to make some kind of peaceful contact with her; speaker after teach-in speaker (especially at Berkeley) raised this issue as a necessary corollary to the question of Vietnam. The government, on the other hand, has been trying to revitalize the old attitudes by transferring intact to Asia the political rhetoric and strategy once applied to Eastern Europe; for the object of "containment," "roll-back," and "encirclement," now read China instead of the Soviet Union; for the source of "international communism," "wars of national liberation," "aggression," and "subversion," now read Peking instead of Moscow. The men who think they successfully executed this policy in Eastern Europe are often the same men who are formulating strategy for Asia today. The teach-ins demonstrate that the passive acceptance of such policies on the part of an influential sector of the American public may be at an end.
after all, are not ants but men. The long slow slide into barbarism of the Western World seems to have quickened. For these photographs are of torturers belonging to an army which could not exist without American aid and counsel. Does this mean that the American policy is sanction torture as a means of interrogation?" (London Daily Telegraph, November 6, 1964.) No amount of argument by realism ("such are the regrettable necessities of war"), or disillusionment ("South Vietnamese not American soldiers commit those things"), or negative example ("the Viet Cong engage in terrorism too") could still the deep moral misgivings expressed at the teach-ins over American behavior in Vietnam.

6. Congressional reluctance to challenge the foreign policy decisions of the executive or even to engage in any but the most ineffective debate on those decisions produced much of the teach-in impetus. Such reluctance was interpreted by many not as a commendable desire to back the President in time of war but as a virtual dereliction of constitutional and traditional authority. When the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's open and televised hearings on Vietnam in February, 1966 were dubbed "Senator Fulbright's Teach-In," more was implied than just a flippancy sobriquet. Senator Fulbright himself (Democrat, Arkansas), who in August, 1964 had helped steer the Congressional resolution which President Johnson has taken as constitutional writ to extend U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, commented ruefully at the time of the February hearings, "Maybe if we held this inquiry earlier, the teach-ins on the university campuses would not have been so necessary." (Quoted by James Reston, The New York Times, February 13, 1966.)

7. The teach-ins were the vehicle by which members of the American academic community, frozen into timidity by the pressures of the McCarthy era, finally emerged from the uneasy comfort of their archives and lecture halls into the arena of political debate. The teach-ins gave courage and gave public voices to some of the keenest and best-informed minds of this nation. Many were impelled to participate by the spectre of a whole generation of German intellectuals standing mute and impotent before violence and unreason.

8. The students had as much to do with starting and sustaining the teach-ins as the professors. Catapulted by the militancy of the Negro civil rights movement, students of the 1960's have finally linked action to idealism. They have gone into the deep South to re-build bombed-out churches. They have sat-in, waded-in, and prayed-in. They have been cattle-prodded, housed, beaten and murdered. They have organized parades, demonstrations, and picket lines on everything from voting in Alabama to controlling the Bomb. They have refused to accept the university as a prep-school for the corporation, Politics and society engage their attention and activism absorbs' their energies. On college campuses their spirit and their organizational skills have been models for their instructors. They taught their teachers; the teach-ins belong as much to the students as to the professors.

9. As political action in the sense of influencing government policy the Vietnam teach-ins have not been successful. One has only to note how far the war has been extended since the time of the first teach-ins to see this. (At that time there were only 16,000 U.S. troops in South Vietnam; bombing raids on the North and South were not as massive, nor had they begun in Laos; there was as yet no serious talk of mining Haiphong, bombing Hanoi or confronting the Chinese themselves if necessary.) Educational counter-escalation against military escalation has not worked so far. But as political action in the sense of bringing large numbers of people together to evaluate policies which affect their lives and to plan further efforts of a mass character to try to change those policies, the teach-ins represent a milestone in American political history at the grass-roots.

10. Perhaps the most exhilarating side-effect of the teach-ins was the re-invigoration of the idea of the university as a real community of scholars and students. During those long nights of verbal give-and-take auditoriums lost their inhibiting severity and became open meeting houses; for once the computerized knowledge factory of 20th century America became a place where students and teachers really planned together and talked and learned together. Often the spirit stayed on well after the teach-in night itself. In the classrooms there appeared greater willingness to show doubt and ask questions about a whole range of previously accepted canons; greater interest in political matters and in the sources and rationale of policy; eagerness to form study and discussion groups. If the State Department has not profited from the teach-ins, this generation of students and educators certainly has.

II. ONE YEAR IN THE LIFE OF THE TEACH-INS: A BRIEF CHRONOLOGY

March 24-25, 1965: First teach-in is held at the University of Michigan. Ann Arbor. From April through May nearly 100 teach-ins take place on campuses across the country.

April 23, 1965: State Department announces formation of "truth teams" to visit campuses in order to counter the teach-in protests. (In May these "teams" engage in debates at the University of Iowa, Drake University, Iowa, the University of Wisconsin, and others.) Secretary of State Dean Rusk, at the Society of International Law, wonders "at the gullibility of educated men..."

April 23-24, 1965: Rutgers University (New Jersey) teach-in. American historian Eugene D. Genovese makes remarks there which are turned into a campaign issue by Republican gubernatorial candidate George C. Wallace. Rutgers and incumbent Governor Hughes defend Genovese's right to speak freely at a teach-in and refuse to drop him from faculty. Dumont trounced in November elections. (Following his remarks made at another Rutgers teach-in, September 30, 1965, Drew College refuses to renew contract of instructor James Melton.)

May 15, 1965: National Teach-In, Washington, D.C. Before huge live, radio and television audiences scholars and government officials debate Vietnam policy. Government business keeping McGeorge Bundy, special assistant to President Johnson for national security affairs, from attending as promised. (As a former Harvard dean turned influential policy maker, Bundy has come under special fire from academic critics of administration policy. In an April letter to 127 faculty members of Washington University, St. Louis, inviting him to come and clarify and justify U.S. policy in Vietnam, Bundy replies, "... if your letter came to me for grading as a professor of government, I would not be able to give it high marks..."

May 21-22, 1965: Mammoth teach-in at the Berkeley campus of the University of California.

June 5-6, 1965: Formation of permanent inter-university teach-in body, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.


October 8-10, 1965: International Teach-In, University of Toronto. Scholars and government officials from many countries debate U.S. Vietnam policy.

March 21-26, 1966: National Week of Teach-Ins organized by Inter-University Committee for Debate on Foreign Policy.

III. A NOTE ON THE BERKELEY TEACH-IN

If the teach-in did not exist Berkeley would have invented it. The Berkeley campus of the University of California has been no stranger to the direct-action techniques of political protest adopted by the present generation of students. Every shade of political opinion is represented there as is every student movement from the smallest sects to those with mass, national followings. The history-making Free Speech Movement was one major reflection of Berkeley's political consciousness and of its ability to translate that consciousness into organized action. The May teach-in was another. The Berkeley teach-in, officially titled a "community meeting," and an "educational protest," as part of "Vietnam Days," May 21-22, 1965, was sponsored by three student and faculty groups (Berkeley faculty members have not lagged behind their students). It was like no other teach-in: it was longer (36 hours), bigger (an aggregate live audience of 30,000 with peak totals reaching 13,000 heard some 50 speakers and entertainers) and more kaleidoscopic (comedians and folk-singers participated; movies were shown; and the widest possible range of oppositional opinion was represented). The Berkeley teach-in could even boast a student demonstration of sympathy in Japan timed to coincide with the event. The lop-sided, anti-administration content of the program was not entirely the intent of the organizers. Academic supporters of administration policy like Eugene Burdick and Robert Scalapino as well as State Department officials and former American ambassadors were invited but all declined to appear. (Two seats on the speaker's podium carried a placard reading "Reserved for the State Department"). Moreover, to charges that the program was unbalanced, the organizers answered that the teach-in was planned as an educational protest and not, despite the professed invitations, as a balanced debate. The presence of entertainers at the teach-in as well as its informal, outdoors setting led some critics to decry the "carnival-like" atmosphere of the event. The listener is invited to judge for himself as to whether that atmosphere affected the political cogency or moral pertinence of the remarks made by the speakers.
IV. SPEAKERS AND TEXTS

There were about 40 speakers at the Berkeley teach-in and each of them had a great deal to say. For the sake of complete nominal coverage 2 or 3-minute sections from each of their speeches might have been excerpted for these recordings but this would have been little justice to either their substance or coherence. The editor has instead selected some of the major addresses and chosen representative passages from them running anywhere from 4 to 23 minutes. In this way, it is hoped that greater depth has been rendered than would have been possible had extensive inclusion been the criterion. For complete texts of all speeches excerpted here (save for Scheer's, Wildavsky's, and some of Stone's question-and-answer remarks) see the volume We Accuse compiled by the Berkeley Vietnam Day Committee (Diablo Press, 1965).

SIDE A, Band 1 For several years now Staughton Lynd has supplemented his scholarship and moral fervor with political action. He is Assistant Professor of American History at Yale University and was an organizer of the Mississippi Freedom Schools. His most notable effort to date on behalf of a Vietnamese settlement was his journey to Hanoi, in violation of a State Department prohibition, on a special fact-finding mission. (See Viet-Report: An Emergency Bulletin on Southeast Asian Affairs, January, 1966).

...The entire educational world looks back now on those few professors who protested what was happening in Nazi Germany with gratitude. And I predict that some day the entire academic community of this country will look back on the few professors who have publicly protested our Vietnam policy and say, "They kept the spirit of truth alive."

We've been talking for a long time in this meeting and we should be beginning to turn our thoughts towards action. But there are two analytical points which I would like to make which I think bear on the action we should take.

First of all, I believe that we have to recognize that this country is not just in a foreign-policy crisis, but in a constitutional crisis as well. This point has been made by the N.Y. Times, which said editorially that a style of executive decision-making and news-manipulation hitherto practiced only briefly in times of temporary emergency has now become a permanent way of life, which means, I think, that the Johnson doctrine has two sides. It means on the one hand that we will not permit governments to come into being overseas that we do not like, even if they are supported by a majority of the people. But the Johnson doctrine also means that the government will not permit the majority of the people of this country to have a reasonable discussion and to determine our own policy. And I think that means that people who have been working in the Freedom Democratic Party have now to realize that it is not only Negroes in Mississippi who are unrepresented in the government of the United States, but in a situation where Congress has handed over its constitutional power to declare war and peace to the President, it is all of us who are now unrepresented by our government. And I think this means too that the Free Speech Movement here and other movements on other campuses which have been concerned with university reform must now concern themselves with the un-elected Board of Regents who run this country.

The second analytical point I wish to make has really been made for me by this morning's newspapers. We are, I think, in a kind of pause now, where the bombing of North Vietnam has been going on long enough that even those of us who most protest it somewhere within ourselves begin psychologically to acquiesce. Just as if Ipana toothpaste is mentioned enough times on the television, you find yourself subliminally reaching for Ipana when you go to the drugstore, so somehow, too, bombing has become almost an accepted part of the scenery. But this situation isn't going to last; there's going to be a new crisis in this country by midsummer, I think, when tens of thousands of American ground troops are in full-scale combat in Vietnam. And we have to be prepared to deal with that crisis when it arrives.

Now, Professor Scalapino said at Washington that what we are doing is simply putting in a small number of American ground troops to check the Vietcong in its expected monsoon offensive so that by September the Vietcong will have overcome the negotiating table. As a historian I think this is madness. Four hundred thousand French troops failed to defeat this nationalist movement. How can we expect that twenty-five thousand, forty thousand, a hundred thousand American troops, will bring them to their knees in one summer? In other words, the troops that are going in are going to be there for a long, long time.

Now, Professor Schlesinger at Washington presented himself as a supporter of this policy with a difference, with certain infinitesimal differences, designed to indicate that he was a supporter of presidential candidate Robert Kennedy rather than Presidential incumbent Lyndon Johnson. And I would like to remind Professor Schlesinger that in February, 1962, the Senator whose Secretary of State he may hope to be, told Homer Bigart of the New York Times, "The United States is in a war in Vietnam, American troops will stay till we win." That's hardly a policy of negotiation.

...Is there an alternative? I think the alternative is nonviolent revolution. And for the benefit of the FBI men present, I would like to make it clear that what I mean is not the violent overthrow of the United States government, but the non-violent retirement from office of the present administration. And further, that the way to bring this about is the creation of civil disobedience so massive and so persistent that the Tuesday Lunch Club that is running this country -- Johnson, McNamara, Bundy and Rusk -- will forthwith resign.

We do not live in a Parliamentary government like the British, where a vote of "no confidence" can compel a criminally irresponsible administration to resign in the Suez crisis. Yet we cannot wait until the next Presidential election in 1968 and, therefore, I think we have to vote with our feet by marching and picketing; vote with our hands by burning our draft cards and refusing to pay income tax; and, if necessary, vote with our backsides by sitting in jail.

...But finally, and most of all, I think that a strategy of non-violent civil disobedience could be successful because I believe in the power of non-violence. Thoreau said in the 1840's that one man who was prepared to die could stop slavery in the United States. And, I think throughout we should all search our hearts and our souls for the courage and the clarity of spirit to go to the White House; to go to the Oakland (Army) Terminal on June 22; to go to Vietnam, if we could, some time in front of the flame-throwers and say, "If blood must be spilt, let it be mine rather than the blood of Vietnamese children. If you need someone to search and destroy, let me save you the trouble, here I am. And if you are worried that the natives all over the world are watching, we want you to know that the natives here at home are restless, too, and maybe there should be a contingency plan to keep some of the Marines here to deal with us."

SIDE A, Band 2 Aaron Wildavsky, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Berkeley, was the only speaker at the teach-in to state unqualified support for the U.S. position in Vietnam. The excerpt is from his remarks in the debate with Robert Scheer (next band) which formed part of the teach-in program.

If you listened in to the debates last Saturday, you understand that the opponents of American policy in Vietnam speak with two voices. One voice says American involvement is immoral. The other, subtle voice says, "That would be all right, but the poor Chinese won't let us get away with it." Other voices are heard that say American policy is grossly immoral, but that considerations of power politics require us to stay in Vietnam.

My position is the opposite. American policy is highly moral on every count. The only question is whether we have the will, the resources, the resolve and the courage to do our duty and stay as we should. If we were to find some criteria as little culture bound as possible for what would benefit the people of South Vietnam, we would say at least that they wish to follow their own customs as they understand them, to have as high a standard of living as possible, to be left alone, and not surprisingly -- to stay alive. A Communist totalitarian regime such as the Vietcong would establish would be on every one of these counts far worse for the citizens of South Vietnam, not merely some ideal democracy, but the real alternative, a weak and fortunately ineffective dictatorship. What would the lives be like of those people under the Vietcong? In the morning up to the sound of bagles, driven to work, work like a dog all day to support the industrialization plans of the regime, standard of living like in every Communist country drops. If the Communists can ruin the economies of advanced states like East Germany and Czechoslovakia, they will have no trouble in Vietnam. But the Communist, unlike little dictators, don't only want your body, they want your soul. And after the day's work is over, you get driven to indoctrination classes. Your free time is not your own. The blare of loud speakers is everywhere. And when not surprisingly the regime discovers it has not managed to murder all of its opponents, it says, "Let a hundred flowers bloom," and some ideologically-minded heads in dissent and they go "Bup-bup-bup" and knock those off too.

Instead of a dictatorial regime which would suppress some of the people some of the time, you get a totalitarian regime that represses all the people all the time. If we were able to construct a torture scale, we would discover that compared to any alternative government, the one proposed will kill more people, break more spirits, destroy more liberty, interfere with the integrity of more citizens, than any alternative, than any alternative whatever. If we turn and say then that in
this type of a situation we could hardly say that in the name of morality turning people over to a totalitarian regime is a good thing, the opponents of American policy will still say that while America is immoral because elections were not held in South Vietnam according to the Geneva agreement. What alternatives in reality did Diem's government face? In 1956, if elections are held, there were two possibilities. One is that the Vietcong would win, and then an election would not be held of a free character ever again. The other is that the Vietcong would lose, and then they simply cry fraud and continue murdering local officials. Look around the world. Did the existence of a democratic and social reformist government in Venezuela stop Communist terrorism? No, they had to be stopped by violence. Does the existence of a democratic and noble experiment in multi-racial government in middle Asia mean that these people are safe from Communist attack which you read about in the newspapers every day? No, they're not, and the same could be said for the Philippines and other kinds of places.

If one believes in democracy and you're not just uttering hypocritical slogans, which is the usual practice, then democracy means not one election but many elections. This primitive notion of social contract theory that says an individual can assign his life and liberty away and in perpetuity forever is obnoxious, because the American people in their infinite wisdom voted twice -- not once but twice -- for Dwight David Eisenhower. Does that mean we are stuck with Eisenhower forever? If you believe in democracy, that means not only continuous election but alternative parties, freedom of speech, the ability to organize, and none of these things are possible under Communist regimes. Not one of them does anything like this. All you could say would be that with a weak dictatorship, you'd have a better chance to do something about it later on.

SIDE A, Band 3 Robert Scheer is Foreign Editor of Ramparts magazine. He has made several trips to Southeast Asia and has studied the United States Got Involved in Vietnam (Report to the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara, California, 1965), which is among the most illuminating brief accounts on the subject.

As I understand it, the fighting in the south started for two reasons. One, these people had been abandoned by their northern leaders, told to wait for elections, and given no other support than frequent proclamations that the elections would come; and secondly, in reaction to the failures of the Diem regime. And as bad as the terror may be in the north, at least it has some kind of popular support. At least it's capable of instituting a viable economy, and none of these things can be said about the terror of the south. It was completely irrational, and it was this irrational terror that provided the basis for the resistance starting up in 1958-59. At any rate, we had a continuation of a war that was much older.

Now I would like to read one statement which seems now to be unbelievable. Joseph Alsop is one of the most outspoken defenders of the administration, but back in 1955 Joseph Alsop was the only American newsmen to travel to the territories of South Vietnam that had been occupied by the Vietcong. They had been occupied by the Vietcong for five years. They had already done many of these radical things that we are afraid they are going to do. They had already instituted their land reforms. They already regimented the population, Joseph Alsop, writing in the New Yorker, June 29, 1955, wrote: "I was able to be able to report, I had hoped to be able to report, that I saw all the signs of misery and oppression that have made my visits to East Germany like nightmare journeys to 1944. But it was not so. At first it was difficult for me, as it is for any Westerner, to conceive of a Communist government genuinely serving the people, I could hardly imagine a Communist government that was also a popular government and almost a democratic government. But this is just the sort of government the Palm Beach state actually was while the struggle with the French continued. The Viet Minh could not possibly have carried on the resistance for one year, let alone nine years, without the people's support, united support." That's Joseph Alsop, 1955. You can find a very similar statement to that in Eisenhower's book Mandate for Change. You also find Eisenhower's military theory that you have to have popular support before you can fight a guerrilla war.4

Now I say this not because I think the system that existed in South Vietnam was a good system, one that I would urge upon the people. But only that they thought so, that they did not share the fear of Ho Chi Minh that our State Department has. And they were not alienated from these people; they rather recognized them as the leaders of their Nationalist Movement. And the nightmare that we have entered into in Vietnam is to try to write their history for them in a different way. Now we have done so because we are responding to two very similar forces to those that motivated the Russians in Eastern Europe; and they are fear and the missionary spirit. The Soviets moved into Eastern Europe because they were frightened of Western capitalism encircling them. They had all sorts of facts and theories about how the capitalists were going to do them in. Secondly, they had a missionary zeal that told them that Communism was the wave of the future and there's really nothing that a Communist government can do anywhere in the world that isn't in a sense in the interest of the working class. Now the United States, it seems to me, is motivated by two similar sources. We are afraid of this Communist devil that is encircling us and about to do us in. Mind you, we are afraid of this Communist devil at the same time as we senders of Communists fighting among themselves and capable of great change. And secondly, we do seem to possess a missionary feeling that we have the right to impose our way of life on any people, even though they feel about it. That there is nothing the United States can do anywhere in the world at any time which is not democratic, in the interests of peace, in the interests of our own security. Now when you start to argue this way it seems to me to be a very dangerous position; that we actually went into the Dominican Republic to enhance people's freedom, that we are in South Vietnam now in a war that Max Clos, the correspondent for Figaro, the French conservative newspaper, called "the machine against the partisan". That we are now bombing the whole South Vietnamese countryside in an attempt to eliminate these guerillas, systematic bombing of the countryside to enhance their freedom. That's a very dangerous position to be in. And as far as its effect on American prestige and power, which I think was the underlying theme of his speech, can anybody seriously argue that Russian prestige and power or Communist prestige and power was enhanced by their crushing the revolution in Hungary? I ask you to think about this not whether you support the Hungarian revolution or not, not whether it was anti-semitic or not, not whether it was supported by the CIA or not. The one salient fact of the Hungarian revolution was that be it a bad or good revolution, most people were for it, whether we liked it or not and whether the Russians liked it or not. Did their crushing that revolution make Communism a more appealing idea? Did they by crushing that revolution enhance the struggle for socialism and communism in the world? I doubt it. I think they stained communism perhaps permanently. And I think that the United States, in attempting to roll back that history of Asia and Latin America, in attempting to tell them that they know what is good for them, to have a professor here in the calm and safety of Berkeley telling a Vietnamese peasant that he has been propagandized and attacked for thirty years by different political systems that he doesn't know what he wants, but that a professor in Berkeley knows what he wants and God damn it, he's going to bomb them if he has to give it to them, seems to me insane.

SIDE A, Band 4 Paul Potter was president of Students for a Democratic Society, a radical group of some 4,000 members concentrating on community organizing in ghettos of Northern cities. Potter's Berkeley address was an expanded version of his remarks at the SDS-sponsored March on Washington, April 17, 1965, which drew some 25,000 persons to the capital to demonstrate against the Vietnamese war.

Most of us grew up thinking that the United States was a great and humble nation that only involved itself in the affairs of other countries reluctantly and as a last and final resort. Most of us grew up thinking that this was a country that was primarily concerned about its own welfare and its own people, that was the first to disarm and the last to arm. If somewhere along the way we heard about, in some disturbing way, things that were happening, or had happened, in Latin America, or China, or Spain, or elsewhere, we were somehow still able to believe in the basic integrity of this country and the basic decency of its purposes internationally.

But now the war in Vietnam -- that war has provided the incredibly sharp razor, the divider, that has finally separated thousands and thousands of people from the illusions about the decency and morality and integrity of this country's purposes internationally. Never again, never again, will the self-righteous, saccharine moralism of promising a billion dollars of economic aid to people while we spend billions and billions of dollars to destroy them -- never again will that moralism have the power to persuade people of the essential decency of this country's aims.

...You see, I think the President is serious. I think the President intends to expand the war in Vietnam. I think the President intends to extend American hegemony into every area of the world where there is the slightest sign of resistance to our will, I think he's serious about that. The question is whether or not we are as serious about stopping him.

I mean we say that we want to end the war in Vietnam, and what does it mean to say that? If you say that you want to end the war in Vietnam, and you really believe that, how can you go back tomorrow to doing the things we did the day before anywhere at any time regardless of how our conversations, attitudes, classes, and discussions that, by their very nature seem to try to say to people that we're not living a crisis, that the world is not about to come apart at the seams? How can you go
back to those things if you're really serious about ending the war in Vietnam? And yet, we will go back -- we will go back, even understanding that going back somehow is suggesting that we, too, are insulated from the consequences of our own decision that we want to end the war in Vietnam. That we, like the President, have somehow failed to hear the screams of a ten-year-old child who is burned by napalm and to accept the consequences of what those screams should say to us, 

This is not just a rhetorical question. It is a problem; it's something that is very deep. Why will we go back tomorrow? Why don't we stop whatever we're doing and stop the war? See I think there's a reason and it is that people know if they were just to stop, that it would be a self-destructive act. To live decently in this society, to do what you believe is right, is self-destructive. It's nihilistic; people should understand that. The reason we create a movement is to create an alternative to nihilism. The reason we create a movement is to give people the opportunity to begin to do something decent with their lives; to stop making their lives a mockery of what they believe. That's why we have to have a movement, but what kind of a movement is it that allows people to do that?

See I want to give you an example; a concrete example. I know a professor who is a German Jew, who fled from Hitler's Germany, who fought in the Italian resistance, who was highly decorated, who is a courageous man. But he's more than that -- he's a beautiful man. He came to this country after the war. He came to this country during the era of McCarthy, and this courageous and beautiful man withdrew very deeply into himself. He hid his politics, and, like many millions of other people, joined the insulation of the University for the introspection of a society that had no public, had no opportunity for people to express themselves and say what they thought was right. And then, a month ago, suddenly this man appeared at the head of a teach-in movement in Ann Arbor, Michigan. What happened? What had happened that allowed him to do that? What had happened that allowed him to do acts that during the fifties would have been self-destructive? And the answer to that is: a movement had happened.

A movement had begun in the South in 1960 and had grown and expanded and had changed and shaped itself to the local situations all over the country, and the man had found the way, finally, to speak out.

And that's what we have to do for one another, you see. We have to create the kind of movement that allows us to come out of our introspection, to come out of ourselves and begin to live decently.

When I say that we're deeply inarticulate, I mean that we don't know how to say that we're alone. We don't know how to say that we are afraid -- afraid to change our lives and do what we know we should do with our lives, you don't have to go to Mississippi to be afraid. You can be afraid right here. You can know that if you do what you want to do, it's an act of self-destruction and what we have to do, you see, is create a way in which we can help one another get over that fear. I'm not sure that you can do it in this setting. I'm not sure you can do it outside of a situation in which people are able, almost physically, to reach out to one another; in which you create a community that is personal and important and strong and gives people the power and the capacity to resist what they know is wrong.

You see, there's a caption on the sign in that SNCC poster that says, "Come, let us build a new world together," and that's what we have to learn to say to one another. I can't say that to you from here because I don't know your names and I can't see your faces and I don't know the expressions on your eyes. There's no way for you to talk back to me, and I can't say what I want to say to you, but we have to learn how to talk to one another. We have to learn how to say -- and I would say if I could say -- "Come, let us build a new world together,"

SIDE B, Band 1 Paul Krassner is "editor and ringleader" of the satirical magazine The Realist. The "teach-in drop-out" he refers to in this excerpt is the late Eugene Burdick, novelist (The Ugly American, Fail-Safe) and political scientist at Berkeley. Burdick refused to participate in the teach-in, denouncing it as "a protest masked as an ideological circus," and predicted that it would be "a spectacular and quite irrational performance (with) comedians, folk-singers, miners, serious commentators, silly commentators... there will be thrills of horror, gasps of partisan shock, laughter, the low bellow of the 'true believer',... but no teaching." At Krassner's invitation the Berkeley audience let out some of those ideological noises predicted by Burdick. For Krassner's complete comic-book rendition see The Realist, No. 59, May, 1969.

...I'm very apolitical which means that I'm here representing the State Department because I feel they're unbalanced. Now here, in one of our State Department publications (this is the S.F. Examiner) I have a long letter from Eugene Burdick, and he says Burdick is an ideological circus, and his implication is that politics and the circus shouldn't be mixed. And I kept thinking he was talking about the Democratic national convention. He says there will be comedians, folk singers, ministers, serious commentators and silly commentators, now I'm one of your silly commentators, and I thought I'd have a little audience participation here because he leaves something out, he said there would be "thrills of horror, gasps of partisan shock, laughter and the low bellow of the true believer." Now if you'd join in with me in a few of these, I'll read them off, okay? Let's have the thrills of horror. Let's hear it up there now. (Audience: Oooo--ooo!) That's the way. Now, let's have a gasp of partisan shock, (Audience: Ugh -- ooo!) That's good; that's good. Very good. All right, now let's see if you can come up with some extremist laughter. (Audience: Yay -- eee!) That's good. All right, now, this one is a real challenge; I want the low bellow of the true believer, (Audience: Mooo -- ooo!) That was good, very good. (Audience applauds.) Don't do that! Do you realize that now the Call-Bulletin will say you're leftist because you applaud for yourselves the way Khruushev did? Every subtle gesture counts. Now the thing about Burdick by the way, is... Oh, there's a new book of his for sale by the way at the literature table out there. It's called I Was a Teach-in Drop-out...

...Now I have here a comic book which I'd like to talk about briefly. This is "Jungle War Stories." It's the only comic book on the market that deals with the war in Vietnam. Every single other one deals with World War II because it's much easier to tell the good guys from the bad guys in that era... Now, on the cover they say: "Helicopters aren't always the answer against the stinging fire of Vietcong guerrillas"-- and they have the answer inside. Now first of all, before that, they have the Vietcong guerrillas who kidnap a bunch of school children. They get spotted by the Vietnamese because they've raided the village before, and so the Vietcong open fire. Now there are several ways you can tell -- subtle ways -- that you can tell the difference between the good guys and the bad guys in the war on Vietnam. One of the ways is by what they say when they die. The Vietnamese say, "Aaaah-eee!" the Vietcong go, "Uuunghh!" whereas the American military advisers go "Arrgh!" You can also tell by the sounds that their weapons make, "The Vietcong weapons go, "Da, da da-da!" (showing the Russian influence). The Vietnamese weapons supplied by the American military advisers go, "Blam! Blam!" with exclamation points.

The Vietnamese General says, "This is a desperate situation. Does anyone have a suggestion?" So they open fire here. Now what happens is that one of the American military advisers and they're all named Duke or Mike and have blond hair -- says, "Maybe I can help, General, there's a crazy idea buzzing around in my bonnet. It goes like this," And he tells them. And they get this carload of stuff shipped. And they come down. And there are the Vietcong looking up, and Mike Williams says In the helicopter, "It's raining hot metal up here. It's time for us to spring a surprise of our own." The surprise is tear gas. Now, I did some research on this. This is the April-June issue. It went on sale in February. It went to the printer in December. The stories were written in November or previous to November. We only announced using tear gas in real life on March twenty-second, So, one begins to get a little suspicious of where the Pentagon gets its military strategy from...

SIDE B, Band 2 Bob Parris is a former philosophy student and now full-time field worker for the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the most radical direct-action body in the civil rights movement, formed soon after the first sit-in at a North Carolina luncheon counter, February, 1960.

...A couple of months ago, a month and a half, people marched out of the North down to Selma. The incident which triggered them off was the killing of Reverend Reith. Before Reverend Reith was killed, a Negro was killed, Jimmy Jackson. His death and his killing didn't trigger anything off, except confusion as to how he was exactly killed. Now we've watched that phenomenon time and again in the South. Before the summer project last year we watched five Negroes murdered in two counties in Mississippi with no reaction from the country. We couldn't get the news out. Then we saw that when the three civil rights workers were killed, and two of them were white, the whole country reacted, went into motion. There's a deep problem behind that, and I think that if you can begin to understand what that problem is, why you don't move when a Negro is killed the same way you move when a white person is killed -- then maybe you can begin to understand this country in relation to Vietnam and the third world, the Congo and Santo Domingo.
I saw a picture in the AP release. It said, "Marine captured Communist rebel." Now I looked at that picture and what I saw was a little colored boy standing against a wire fence with a huge white Marine with a gun in his back. But what I knew was that the people in this country saw a Communist rebel. And that we travel in the realm of realities. And that the problem about Vietnam is how to change the reality of this country, which is isolated, how to switch that. That's going to be a very deep, deep problem.

I think that there is one chance of doing that, in terms of the psychology of this. And that is, if you understand that you have part of the third world in this country and if you can get a mirror and look into it, and if you can learn to look at the South differently, I mean the South has got to be a looking glass, not a lightning rod. You can't go down there and get rid of all the things which make you feel that you're good, and not learn something from it. You've got to learn from the South if you're going to do anything about this country in relation to Vietnam. You've got to. You've got to take the fact that the juries won't convict when people get killed who are civil rights workers and Negroes, and plumb it and find out what it means. Because it says something about a whole society which permits people to plan and execute murder. You can learn when is it that a society gets together and plans and executes and allows its members to murder and then go free. The jury won't convict. And if you learn something about that, then maybe you'll learn something about this country and how it plans and executes murders elsewhere in the world.

SIDE B, Band 3 "Dr. Spock says..." has become an American household phrase wherever there are young children. In addition to being one of the foremost authorities on child care, Dr. Benjamin Spock is also co-chairman of the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy ($ANE$).

People ask me why a children's physician is concerned with peace and disarmament. My answer is that if I'm convinced that the physical dangers of nuclear destruction are so much greater than the danger of death from the ordinary diseases and accidents, and if I'm convinced that the long-term psychological effects of the Cold War are worse than the ordinary family strains that I've made my career of discussing then it seems to me that it's up to a children's doctor and an adviser of parents to talk to parents about this, too...

... An example of what I think is happening to children was described in one of the studies that was made of children's reactions to the Cold War. This was a fifth-grade class who happened to be looking at photographs of the Russian countryside, and one of the photographs showed a tree-lined road. One of the children in the class asked, "What are the trees along the road for?" And two children in the class spontaneously volunteered answers. One child said, "The trees are to keep the people from seeing what's going on on the other side of the road." The other child said, "They plant the trees in order to make work for the prisoners." To me, these are very sick attitudes for American children to be acquiring. We've always been proud, I think, of having brought up American children, in the past, to feel that they probably would be able to cope with whatever life had to offer. I think this is one of the reasons why Americans have been resourceful in coping with what life offered, and I think we've been proud, in the past, of having brought up American children to be able to deal comfortably with people of all kinds and all ages. This is one of the reasons why Americans have impressed people in other parts of the world with their friendliness and their capacity to deal cooperatively with people. But if we're going to bring up increasing proportions of American children with the feeling that our adversaries are going to outwit us and destroy us, I think that they will be less effective people when they grow up. I think that they will be less and less stable, so that they can be led more and more easily into war and other international ventures without protest. And I think that we will bring up increasing proportions of our children with a terrible "suspiciousness" of fellow Americans that will make the McCarthy period seem pale by comparison.

The Greeks had a saying: "Whom the gods would destroy, they first drive mad." The thing that terrifies me is not so much the actual military dangers that we've gotten into, but the fact that we seem to be progressively losing our sense of reality. This is what is going to endanger our country more and more...

SIDE B, Band 4 L. F. Stone is publisher of and chief contributor to L. F. Stone's Weekly, Washington's four-page journalistic gadfly and one of the most consistent sources of honest information and balanced analysis on Vietnam. The excerpts heard here are from a question-and-answer session between Stone and the audience...

... The question is about the speculation that we bomb North Vietnam in order to goad China into coming into the war so that we can smash China's nuclear installations. There is a great deal of talk in military circles, I'm sorry to say, in Washington about smashing China, and it's very terrible and very criminal and very foolish and very mad, in my opinion. We can't smash China, we can't smash that big a part of the world...
most startling proposal made at the Berkeley teach-in. For Arnoni’s complete address see The Minority of One, July, 1965; for a discussion of his Berkeley proposal see the same publication for September, 1965,

...I am appalled by the dry, detached, impersonal, unmotivated type of debate that goes on among some professors, which is hatred as the passport to academia, and which is supposed to be displayed with equal sterility whether things concern the wiping out of nations or the desirability of fluoride in our water. Not only Elkhoff’s cold efficiency is inhuman and diabolic but also, and even more so, his moral neutrality. To insist on decorum and politeness in the slaughterhouse of nations is the very peak of human self-deception and of a hellish type of snobbery.

It is thus I speak to you here not only as one who tries to observe and analyze international relations but also as one who survived six years of internment in Nazi concentration camps; as one who has lost in them all of his next of kin, all those he grew up with; as one who, confronting the fire-slinging chimneys of the Auschwitz crematoria, could not comprehend how much of the world stood passively and silently by witnessing Hitler’s genocide. As a survivor of that Gehenna, I believe to be morally justified when invoking here the memory of the millions who did not survive. If they could call out to you from their graves or from the fields and rivers upon which their ashes were thrown, they would implore this generation of Americans not to be silent in the face of the genocidal atrocities committed on the people of Vietnam.

This is no time to silent! When a war is waged by American and American-led troops against a people whose vast majority, as all accounts agree, would not have American troops on their soil, this is no time to be silent! When eight million Vietnamese, including ten million more Vietnamese refugees, are taken by overflying American pilots as enemies and therefore as targets for their bullets, this is no time to be silent! An American genocide is not preferable to a German genocide; and the indifference of millions of Americans as criminal and inhumane as was the indifference of millions of German onlookers...

In the present life-and-death struggle of the Vietnamese people there must be among America’s youth some who are sufficiently sensitive to justice, sufficiently outraged by the conscienceless actions of their Government, and sufficiently courageous -- to join the people of Vietnam in their heroic self-defense...

They, these volunteers, will be the heroes of a future American civilization. They will make a unique contribution toward the emergence of such a America as will survive the present empire-building stage and be accepted into the family of man not in fear and terror but in earned respect and honor. Thank you.

SIDE C, Band 1 American novelist Norman Mailer often engages in public debate on political themes. Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Great Society, and the war in Vietnam have been subjects for his special brand of politico-existential analysis, as in his Berkeley address. The complete text was reprinted in The Realist, No. 60, June, 1965.

... "Hot Damn! Viet Nam! Vietnam, that little ol’ country which had been under his nose all these years. Things were gettin’ too quiet in Vietnam," If there was one thing hotter than Harlem in the summer, it was air-raids on rice paddies and napalm on red gooks. Now we had a game. When the war got too good, and everybody was giving too much space to that, he could always tell the Negroes it was a good time to be marching on the White House. When they got a little too serious, he could bring back Vietnam. He could even make all those Barry Goldwater rednecks and state troopers happy. That was a happy nation when everybody had something going for them. The Nigras had their civil rights and the rednecks could be killing gooks. Yes, thought the President, his friends and associates were correct in their estimate of him as a genius. "Hot Damn! Viet Nam!"

... I believe our present situation in Vietnam is so irrational that any attempt to deal with it logically is illogical in the way surrealism is illogical and rational political discussion of Adolf Hitler’s motives was illogical and then obscene. Bombing a country at the same time you are offering aid is as morally repulsive as beating up a kid in an alley and stopping to ask for a kiss! Reading the papers these days is a nightmare of unrequited love. If one’s country lives like a woman in some part of the unconscious dream life of each of us, if beneath all our criticisms and devastations of American vulgarity, misuse of power and sheer pompous stupidity, there’s been still some optimistic love affair in the secret potentials of this nation, some buried unvoiced faith in the future of America was finally good, not evil, well, that faith has taken a pistol-whipping in the last month. The romance seems not even tragic or doomed but dirty and misplaced. Still, let me assume there is some point in trying to be reasonable about Vietnam. And it is only to say that there is logic in the situation. But let me at least make one straightforward attempt to understand what transpires there. I will, however, insist that the logic we employ runs close to the vein of theological argument, for we must try to speak rationally about a mystery...

Would it make sense if we say Lyndon Johnson is alienated? "Alienated to what?" you may ask. But one must speak first of alienation, that intellectual category that would take by many a turn of the mind in its attempt to explain that particular corrosive sensation so many of us feel in the chest and the guts so much of the time -- that sense of the body growing empty within, of the psyche pierced by a wound whose dimensions keep opening, that unendurable conviction that one is hollow, displaced, without a single identity at one’s center. I quote Eric Josephson: "Alienation has been used to refer to an extraordinary variety of psycho-social disorders, including loss of self, anxiety states, anomic, despair, depersonalization, rootlessness, apathy, social disorganization, loneliness, alienation, powerlessness, meaninglessness, isolation, pessimism, and the loss of belief or values." Among the groups described as alienated are women, industrial workers, white collar workers, migrant workers, artists, suicides, mentally disturbed, addicts, the aged, the young generation as a whole, juvenile delinquents in particular, voters, non-voters, consumers, audiences of mass media, sex deviates, victims of prejudice and discrimination. An added device is to couple, bureaucratize, political radicals, the physically handicapped, immigrants, exiles, vagabonds and recluse. A comprehensive list! Is anything to be gained by adding to it the name of Lyndon Johnson?

You may still ask, "What is he alienated from? The Asian peasant...? The dishwasher at the Istanbul Hilton?" Of course not, you cannot be alienated unless you wish to participate. Lyndon Johnson does not wish to share a bowl of rice with an Asian peasant...

How then is he alienated? And from what? And I say to you -- in no disrespect and much unease -- it is possible he is alienated from his own clear sanity. That his mind has become a consortium of monstrous disproportions, of pictures of himself in duplicate -- 40 feet high, 80 feet high. Lyndon Johnson is not alienated from power. He is the most powerful man in the United States. But he is alienated from judgment. He is close to an imbalance which at worst could tip the world from orbit...

America is a country which has never decided what its nature is, It is a country in which every citizen is perpetually confronting the fact that he doesn’t know if he’s a member of a good country or a bad country, a noble country or a mean country, and so for that reason the psychology of a member of a minority group sits upon every American, I believe.

Now this state, which as I say, demands action -- is a demand which will either kill a brave man or force him to grow. But when a coward is put in need of much action, a coward tears the wings off flies. The great fear that lies upon America is not that Lyndon Johnson is privately close to insanity, so much as that he is the expression of the near insanity of most of us. And his need for action is America’s need for action. Not brave action, but action. Any kind of action; any move to get the motors going.

A future death of the spirit lies close and heavy upon American life. A cancerous emptiness at the center which calls for a circus. The country is in disease, It has been in disease for a long time. There has been nothing in our growth which is organic. We never solved our depression. We merely went to war back in 1941 and, going to war, never won it -- not in our own minds, not as men. We won it, but as sources of supply. We still do not know that we are equal to the Russians. We won a war, but we did not really win it -- not in the secret of our sleep. So we have not really had a prosperity, we’ve had fever. We’ve grown rich because of one fact with two opposite interpretations.

The fact is that there’s been a cold war. There’s been a cold war which came either because Communism was indeed a real threat to our freedom or it was a cold war which came because capitalism could not survive without an economy geared to war. Or is it both reasons? Who can know? Who can really know? The center of our mind is an enigma. Is the thought of revolution a nightmare of unrequited love? If one’s country lives like a woman in some part of the unconscious dream life of each of us, if beneath all the...
had a secret police organization and an invisible government large enough by now to occupy the moon. We have hunted communists from the top of the Time-Life building to the bottom of the Collier mine. We have hunted down that many, not that many. And we have looked like Keystone Cops ...

Our country was fearful, half mad, inauthentic. It needed a purge or it needed a war. Bile was stirring in the pits of the nation's conscience, and little to oppose it, but a lord of guilt cold as the most moral man. We took formal public steps toward a great society -- that great society which has the job tattitudes and bad architecture, of psychoanalysis, superhighways, astronauts, vaccinations and a Peace Corps, that Great Society where nothing but frozen corn would be sold in the small towns of Iowa, where censorship would disappear but every image would be manipulated from birth to death. Something in the buried animal of modern life grew bestial at the thought of this Great Society. The most advanced technological nation in the civilized world was the one now closest to blood, to shedding the blood and burning the flesh of Asian peasants it had never seen. The Pentagon had been kept on a leash for close to twenty years, Presidents so mediocre in their talents as Truman and Eisenhowe had kept the military from dominating the nation, but Johnson did not ... Now I have one set of remarks more to make. They concern practical suggestions. I've been visionary in my demands. For instance in 1965 to ask of America that it return to isolationism. No, this country wishes to have an empire. The grimiest truth may be that half of America at least must be not unwilling to have a war in Vietnam. Otherwise Lyndon Johnson could not have made his move, since Lyndon Johnson never in his life has dreamed of moving against a majority. Let us then insist on this: It is equally visionary, but it is at least visionary in a military way, and we are talking to telliars. Let us say that if we are going to have a war with the Vietcong, let it be a war of foot soldier against foot soldier. If we wish to take a strange country away from strangers, let us at least be strong enough and brave enough to defeat them on the ground. Our marines, some would say, are the best soldiers in the world. The counter-argument is that native guerrillas can defeat any force of a major power man-to-man. Let us then fight on fair grounds. Let us say to Lyndon Johnson to monstrous McNamara, and to the generals on the scene, "Fight men, Go in man-to-man against the Vietcong. Call off the Air Force, they prove nothing except that America is coterminous with the Mafia. Let us win man-to-man or lose man-to-man, but let us stop pulverizing people whose faces we have never seen." But, of course, we will not stop, nor will we ever fight man-to-man against poor peasants, their vision of existence might be more ferocious and more demoralized than our own. No, we would rather go on as the most advanced monsters of civilization, pulverizing tinastick with our detonations, our State Department experts in their little bow ties, and our bombs. Only listen, Lyndon Johnson, you've gone too far this time. You are a bully with an Air Force, and since you will not call off your Air Force, there are young people who will persecute you back. It is a little thing, but it will wound you into nightmares and endless corridors of night without sleep, it will wound you. For listen, this is only one of the thousand things they will do. They will go on marches and they will make demonstrations, and they will begin a war of public protest against you which will never cease. It will go on and on and it will get stronger and stronger. But listen to just one of the thousand things that they could do. Just listen to this little thing, which is one. These young people are, I think, going to print up little pictures of you, Lyndon Johnson, the size of post-cards, the size of stamps. And some of them will glue these pictures to walls and posters and telephone booths and billboards. I don't advise it. I would tell the young people not to do it to you, but they will. They will find places to put these pictures. They will want to paste your picture, Lyndon Johnson, on a postcard and send it to you. Some will send it to your enemies. Some will send these pictures to men and women in other schools. These pictures will be sent everywhere. These pictures will be pasted up everywhere -- upside down! Silently, without a word, everywhere. Your head will speak out, even to the peasant in Asia. It will say that 10 million Americans are unaware of your monstrous vanity, overweening piety and doubtful motive. It will tell them that we trust our President so little and think so little of him that we send his picture everywhere upside down, Vietnam! Hot Damn! You, Lyndon Johnson, will see those pictures up everywhere -- upside down, Four inches high and forty feet high. You, Lyndon Baines Johnson, are going to be coming up for air, everywhere, upside down. Everywhere, upside down! Upside down!

SIDE C, Band 2 Mario Savio is a philosophy student, civil rights worker, and the famous leader of the Free Speech Movement that exploded on the Berkeley campus during the Fall semester of 1964. (See Berkeley: The New Student Revolt by Hal Draper, Grove Press, 1965.) At the time of the teach-in Savio was on trial with 164 others for participating in the massive sit-in staged by over 1000 students at Sproul Hall, the Berkeley Administration Building, December 2-3, 1964. In the teach-in address Savio relates his experiences in the Free Speech Movement (FSM) and offers aspects of the Vietnamese situation. Clark Kerr is President of the University of California. The CCPA was the Committee on Campus Political Activity formed during the crisis to represent administration, faculty, and students; 16 of its 12 members were appointed by the administration and the FSM refused to participate. Professor Scalapino headed an ad hoc Council of Department Chairmen and with Clark Kerr spoke at a special university convocation at the campus's Greek Theatre of computers and pills to ease the crisis. Savio tried to speak but was muscled off the stage by campus policemen; when a riot threatened he was allowed to make a brief announcement ...

...I have a naive belief in the generosity of our fellow-countriesmen, that if they knew the facts, with even the incredible lack of clarity that we have, I believe they would move to affect their governmen in such a way as to change its policy. But they don't know the facts, and from our own experience we can see why. Consider something very close to home: what happened on campus last semester. And consider the way it was reported in the press. Consider that. Now I had never, before that, been able to compare an important historic event with the way it was reported, because I'd never been in on any important historic event, because I was only a citizen. But last semester I was engaged in causing important historic events. We all were. And we all had the opportunity to see just what those events were. And there was no comparison, or a very slight comparison, which could be drawn between the reporting and the events.

And look again -- personal experience -- look at the incompetents, the 24 incompetents, who are put in charge of the University of California. These are the people who make fundamental policy which governs our lives. At this last Regents' meeting, representation of the Free Student Union, were present at the meeting of this governing board. They were not permitted to speak officially, and so one of them, in desperation and eloquence, said, (this was Bob Bundy),

We have asked to be heard, you have refused. We have asked for justice, you have called it anarchy. We have asked for freedom, you have called it license. Rather than face the fear and hopelessness you have created, you have called it communistic. You have accused us of failing to use legitimate channels. But you have closed those channels to us, You, and not us, have built a university based on distrust and dishonesty.

In the course of that speech, Governor Brown told Bob to shut up and called the police. That's one example of the body set up and a mechanism set up to make decisions in America.

Another example -- very important, President Kennedy, who some of us felt, at the beginning in any case, offered some hope as a more responsible leader, sponsored and supported Comsa, or what has become Comsat, the Communications Satellite Corporation, and private corporation, Some people, including, I believe, Senator Morse, opposed this. And there was a liberal filibuster in the Senate. It didn't last very long. But President Kennedy, supported Comsat, it has on its governing board some people representing the public and some representing private industry, Representing the public, on the whole governing board, according to Drew Pearson, are three people. Let me tell you who they are. Representing that part of the public which is business -- this is in addition to those representing private corporations -- is someone whose name I don't know from General Motors. He has come to virtually every meeting. Representing labor -- all of labor (aren't many of those in America) -- is Mr. Meany. Now that's like the Urban League representing the civil rights movement, Representing the public -- that's those who are neither laborors nor businessmen (for example, students and housewives) -- and just listen, is Clark Kerr. He has, according to this report, not come to one meeting. (That's the way decisions are made in America. This is not all Public and private corporation, public and private, and the public is represented... I'm very pessimistic, very pessimistic...

Well, National Liberation Front, I don't know altogether that much about; I wish I knew an awful lot more about it than I do. But I know that in some ways -- and this you can even get from the reports in the Tribune -- in some ways, it's the counterpart of those dastardly FSM people last semester, in some ways. That means to me, if you have negotiations which take place between the United States and the Soviet Union and even Communist China, and possibly Rome, but you leave out the National Liberation Front, that's like the CCPA without FSM, Impossible! I tell you, if I were involved in such a revolution, I would rather die than get out under those circumstances. All right. Which are the kinds of people who are proposing things like "If you stop fighting altogether, we'll give you a good payoff?" Well,
you know they're the same kinds of people who opposed us here, when we fought on campus last semester. And right now I'm not talking about the reactionaries on the Board of Regents. I'm talking about some liberals, that's what I'm talking about. Who is one, one of the architects of American foreign policy in Vietnam? Robert A. Scalapino. Who is it on December 7th (remember the Greek Theater), who was it on December 7th, who, with Clark Kerr, mouthed those magnificent generalities and hypocritical cliches which were supposed to end the crisis without letting the Academic Senate even have its say? These are the same people, same ones. Those who want to make decisions by a kind of elite "know-how" here at the University of California are the same ones who will refuse repeatedly to let people, just little ordinary people, take part in decision-making wherever there are decisions to be made.

SIDE C, Band 3 Dick Gregory has always found the time during a successful career as a show business comedian to participate actively alongside his people in the civil rights struggle.

... Yeah, I called LBJ the other day. I tried to discuss the Vietnam crisis with him. Oh, I call him every now and then. It's very important to me because I'm going to be honest with you, I'm not about to fight them Red Chinese. When you stop and think Red China has something like 688 million folks, and I say folks because people might scare the hell out of you. And when you stop and think Red China got 688 million people, if they ever start singing "We Shall Overcome," they gonna do it, baby. You realize, Red China got more census takers than we got people?

... Not only are there 688 million Chinese, but they're right down underneath us. And wouldn't it be wild if they ever come in and decide to drive all guns at the same time and stomp their feet together. And what really knocks me out is when Red China blasted off their second nuclear blast and our State Department called it primitive, I called Dean Rusk that morning. I said "Hey, boy," He said, "Greg, I guess I goofed again." "You damn right you goofed, man. I want to know how you gonna call Red China's nuclear blast primitive when you scared of my switch blade?" And then he informed me that it wasn't the nuclear blast that the State Department was referring to as being primitive. What he meant by that statement, he said, that through our intelligence -- if that's what they want to call it -- we have found that it would take Red China 20 to 30 years to develop the vehicle to deliver that bomb over here. That's what he told me, I said, "Man, you realize with 688 million people, they can hand-carry that bomb over here."

It's been said that we here know nothing about what's going on. Well, I'll tell you one thing I don't know that much about what's going on but I know last Sunday in Saigon, the marines had a race riot. They did their best to keep it away from a lot of people but it still made the papers. They watered it down a whole lot because when I first read the headline of the article and it said "Marines fighting in Saigon," I said, "Well, they been fighting there. Hell, they must be trying to tell us something new." And I read it and it come out they talking about a race riot. In Saigon. We had a race riot over there. And here's people saying this meeting's no good because we don't know what's going on. Huh? Well, I tell you what, if we don't know what's going on in Vietnam today the government damn sure had enough time to tell us. And the only reason people from the State Department didn't show up here is because they know the only thing they would tell you, you wasn't going to buy...

There's a whole lot of people in the Federal Government that don't like what's going on, but they have to put up with it because they haven't got crowds like you that's with them. And the larger these crowds get, the more people in the Federal Government gonna start screaming about all of these wrongs and these illnesses. Thank God for You.

Now, in closing: If you can be labelled Communist, if the civil rights movement can be labelled Communist, then they better go back and label Tom Paine an Communist because all we're doing today is what Tom Paine said years ago in his "Wintertime Soldier": "If there be trouble, let it be in my time, that my children may have peace." No more, no less. Had your parents read Tom Paine thoroughly, we might not have to be here now. But they didn't. What you are doing here tonight, unborn kids around the world will be affected by it, if you don't stop. In our generation, we produced the mad man that created the nuclear bomb, or we produced the intelligence that let him do it. And the mad man got hold of it. And now he has contaminated the air with nuclear radiation. And you young brilliant kids are gonna have to create a mind to vacuum clean the air. And this is the best vacuum-cleaner I've seen yet. That's what you're doing here.

As far as war, as far as the way that radical group will say, "Ah, they're just holding that meeting because they want to duck the draft. They'll always think of little petty things to say, but I'll tell you one thing. I'm not against armies as long as that's the army that's just gonna come in after the tornado and help clean up. I'm not against the Army I'm just against the type of army that's gonna go around the world and distribute food to everyone. But I'd love to ask the boys in Washington, D.C., how a Negro can stand up and says he's non-violent; and White man comes that and send me over to kill somebody? No, non-violence to me means not that I'm not supposed to hit an American white man. Non-violence means to me that Death might put me on its payroll, but I'll never put Death on my payroll. So if America goes into a full-scale war, it's too late. Non-violence has captured me.

But I tell you what: just so these little stupid groups wouldn't say Dick Gregory didn't go because he wanted to stay back here and make money, if I ever get drafted again, I'm going. But I'm going go instead of the government making a deal with me, I'm gonna make a deal with the government; I'll go in your army, I'll sit through all your training under one guarantee -- that when my basic training is over, you'll send me to the front line. And I don't want to take your gun with me this time. And if I can give my life on that front line for all of this wrong, I would much rather do that, than kill a man, be I right or wrong. Thank you so very much for being here tonight. God bless you, Hope to see you again, real soon.

SIDE D, Band 1 Ernest Gruening, former journalist, New Deal official, former Governor of and former Senator for Alaska, has been, together with Wayne Morse (Democrat, Oregon), the Johnson administration's severest and most persistent Senate critic on Vietnam policy.

Congratulations, friends, on this very wonderful outpouring of enthusiasm and talent. These are the kinds of meetings and demonstrations that we need to bring home the fact, which we believe and hope to be true, that in America public sentiment, ultimately, if not immediately, controls public policy and if the mail that I've been receiving is any indication, what public sentiment is, the policies of the Administration are bound to be modified and, we hope, before long reversed in South Vietnam and in Southeast Asia.

Now if this is a teach-in, we are all going to qualify as teachers of those who are less informed and I think it is particularly important that everybody be informed so that the true facts, and not those that have been presented as official doctrine, be known to everybody...

Now the main consideration -- and this is part of the Government's presentation -- was that this friendly government of Diem's government was to come in. Well, Diem was our puppet. He had been brought there to take over after the playboy emperor Bao Dai had left. We asked our way in. The record is very clear that President Eisenhower -- and this is all in the printed record -- sent General Collins, a four-star general, to make arrangements with Diem for us to come in with military assistance. So we got in there, and unfortunately we stayed there. Several years later when President Kennedy took office, he was persuaded by Secretary McNamara, who continues to be the chief adviser on South Vietnam policy, along with one or two others, the brothers Bundy and General Taylor, to escalate our assistance. The so-called advisers really were not advisers at all; they were actually in combat. And this is one of the many instances in which the Administration has never quite levelled with the American people. The story that is told is never quite exactly what happened to the friendly government of Mr. Diem? Well, he became more and more oppressive, more and more ruthless. He jailed thousands of people for no reason whatsoever except that they were not in favor of his regime, and finally we had to dispose of him.

But meanwhile, let's go back to what happened when the French were finally defeated. A conference of fourteen nations was called at Geneva to dispose of that problem after the military victory which had thrown out the French. It was decided at this conference that three nations would be reborn, resurrected out of the former French colony, namely, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. And Vietnam was to be temporarily -- but only temporarily -- divided for a period of two years at the 17th parallel, and then elections were to be held which would determine who would be the elected rulers or officials of this re-united nation. Unfortunately, and very regrettably, the United States connived at and counselled the government which it controlled, the government of Diem, to refuse to hold these elections with the result that this was a betrayal of a solemn commitment, while we did not sign the Geneva Accord, we issued a unilateral statement approving it and pledging us to support it. And when the election was cancelled, this was a distinct violation of the most essential part of that agreement.

And then, and only then, did the civil war break out, a civil war which was justified by the belief of the people in South Vietnam that they had been betrayed, that solemn pledges had been broken.

Now at that time, we were not in as deeply as we were later. But we moved in rather rapidly, and in so doing, with additional military per-
sonnel and large numbers of weapons, we were also in violation of the Geneva Accord, which forbade the introduction of any new weapons or any additional troops. There was violation also in the North side, but our violation was greater, more official. And the fact that one side violated did not justify our violating. In fact we were in violation of the United Nations Charter which at that time should properly have been invoked to try peaceful means of settling this dispute, I'd like to read you this because I think it's an important part of your role as future teachers to point out how repeatedly we have violated solemn commitments and treaties. We bear a lot of the brunt of aggression from the North and there has been some, but we never hear about the far greater and earlier aggression from the South, which we connived at and which we made our policy.

Now, Article 33 of the United Nations Charter is brief and very specific. It says:

"... the parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security" (And this is certainly the kind of dispute we have had in Southeast Asia) "shall first of all" (please note the words first of all) "seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of our own choice."

Well now, I ask you, have we at any time since this situation developed, since it became an undeclared war, have we sought a solution, "first of all" either by negotiation, or inquiry, or mediation, or conciliation, or arbitration, or judicial settlement, or resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of our own choice? Obviously, we haven't. And I maintain that if we had used the peaceful means as assiduously as we have waged war, we would not be in the mess that we're in today...

In his Johns Hopkins speech, President Johnson changed slightly from the previous position that we wouldn't negotiate until Hanoi agreed in advance to stop its aggressions. We said now we were entering into unconditional negotiations. But unfortunately there were some very definite conditions attached. One of them was the constant reference to the future of a free and independent South Vietnam. Well the fact of the matter was that the whole civil war down there arose largely over the fact that we had refused to allow the election to unite these two countries, and unless some hope is held for a future reunification of this country, it is very unlikely that those who are fighting the civil war will agree. And in the second place, although President Johnson offers to negotiate with Hanoi, he has not offered to negotiate with the people who are actually fighting the war, namely the South Vietnamese liberation front. And until those two conditions are removed by implication, I see no hope of a peaceful settlement...

What is our hope now? What is the best prospect? I admit that the answer is not easy, but anything would be better than this continued killing. Anything! Any kind of a peace would be preferable than this kind of a war. I think we should urge first of all -- and this may not work -- first of all, a change in the "unconditional" conditions by which the Administration would agree to hold out the hope of a reunified Vietnam -- not necessarily immediately but after supervised elections which we should call for; call for a cease-fire on both sides, try for a peace-keeping team of the kind that we have used successfully in several parts of the world -- a peace-keeping United Nations team which has kept the peace on the border between Israel and the United Arab Republic. We haven't tried it. We go on from there.

But in any event, let's keep up our protests, let's keep up our education, and let's show that the American people do not believe in this war. I know it from my mail, since I spoke 14 months ago on this subject in the Senate, and last August I was one of two Senators who voted against giving the President a blank check to wage war if he wanted -- my mail has run a hundred to one. Now at that time last August when the President sent down this resolution which he wanted us to approve following the Tonkin Gulf incident, there were only two of us. Nobody in the House, and only two in the Senate. Two or three weeks ago, we had another request for support -- seven hundred million dollars to carry on the war, although the President made clear that he didn't have the money, that he couldn't transfer it, but he wanted a show of loyalty. Well, we improved our position in the Senate -- there were three of us this time, so we made a gain of 50%, and in the House, the score was much better. It went from zero to seven; and three of them were members of your California delegation, and I want to congratulate them and you. Now some of your economics students can figure out what the percentage of increase is, from zero to seven. I think it's something like infinity. But in any event, that's progress, and let's keep on with our educational drives, and let's try to work for every opportunity for a peaceful solution. Nothing could be worse than what is going on now, and as it escalates, it will be worse and still worse. Thank you very much.

SIDE D, Band 2 Isaac Deutscher, former revolutionary, distinguished historian and biographer of Stalin, Trotsky, and (forcoming) Lenin, delivered one of the most acclaimed addresses at the Berkeley teach-in -- a long, lucid and eloquent exposition on the origins, development and mythologies of the Cold War.

Ladies and Gentlemen: friends; I think I have the peculiar privilege and honor of being the only non-American to partake in these teachings, in Washington and here. I don't know what to merit, I owe you this honor, but it gives me an immense gratification to see you here, to see this immense crowd listening to speeches past midnight. I see in this a symptom of the awakening of the critical spirit in this country, of the awakening of the political and moral energy of a new American generation. And allow me, please, to greet in you America's future.

I do not intend to speak on Vietnam. I think that the speakers that preceded me have nearly exhausted the subject. Nor is it my task to give advice, even from the left, to the American administration -- what it ought to do in Vietnam. I'm here as an outsider, and I am not even criticizing American policy in particular. I am criticizing Western policy at large...

Therefore, I think that it is necessary to subject to a brief scrutiny the major assumptions and misassumptions, conceptions, and misconceptions, illusions and myths of the cold war. So because all these reappear in one form or another in the present Vietnamese crisis, therefore, I hope, bear with me if, past midnight, I allow myself this brief excursion into the history of the cold war in order to lay bare these assumptions. I take a very high view of your endurance, my friends, and of your intellectual curiosity. I want to pass in review a few of the major assumptions of the cold war.

The first major assumption has been the assumption always of the military threat from Communism, either from Russia or from China. Immediately after the Second World War when the two powers embarked upon the reversal of alliances, upon the great conflict with its former Soviet ally, people usually spoke about the two colossi, the American and the Russian, that face each other in hostility across a power vacuum. It was assumed that one of the colossi, the Russian, threatened the American, the Western. What people did not realize then, what the governments did not tell them, was that these two colossi, one -- the American -- emerged from the Second World War in full-blooded vigor and strength, immensely wealthy, with hardly any losses suffused in the war compared with the other allies, with the other colossus, the Russian, lay almost prostrate, bleeding profusely from all his wounds. And that almost prostrate colossus, bled white, was assumed to create a major military threat to Europe -- to threaten with an invasion of Europe. That colossus, Russia, lost in the last war over 20 million people in dead alone...

Then there was another set of illusions and myths which is interesting if you want to study the psychology and the mentality of our ruling classes; the myth of American nuclear superiority, the myth of an unchallengeable, absolute American nuclear superiority. If, on the one hand, Russia's ability to strike at the West was, to put it very euphemistically, greatly over-stated, Russia's potential strength, potential industrial capacity for development was greatly and ridiculous under-rated. Those of you who are old enough will remember that the experts told us in those years: that Russia will never have an atomic bomb because she doesn't have the uranium ore. Then it was that Russia didn't have the engineering resources to produce nuclear energy. Then Russia didn't have the know-how. And then, when Russia did split the bomb, we were told that she couldn't produce them in sufficient numbers to change the military situation. Then were we told that the Russians would never have the means of delivering those warheads. And then we were told that Russia couldn't produce the hydrogen bomb, illusion after illusion. A chain of illusions, one exploded after the other. And yet, until the Russian Sputnik soared into outer space, the assumption of America's unchallengeable technological superiority in every field, in every military field, was taken for granted -- here and also in Britain and in the whole of western Europe. What accounts for this curious arrogance and wishful thinking? What accounts for this? I believe that our rulers sincerely -- sincerely -- thought that the Russians would never challenge the West in the field of nuclear energy because brought up in the capitalist system, convinced of the superiority of their system, convinced that social order in which known as private initiative, the private initiative of the big trusts and cartels, the private initiative of the financial oligarchies doesn't work, they assumed that such a system couldn't really work and couldn't really produce nuclear energy. The arrogance was the arro-
CU's 'Teach In' Was Superb

The 18-hour Viet Nam "Teach In" at the University of Colorado Thursday night was one of the noblest achievements in the history of higher education in this state.

It was a credit to the university itself, to the students and faculty members who organized it and to the hundreds of young people who sat through the long night absorbed in their country's most pressing foreign policy problem.

Not just two positions, but a dozen, on the what they had said or offered their own comment.

They asked informed and penetrating questions. They argued with each other and with facts to support their positions. They understood before the evening was over that the problem is complex and not simple that it does not lend itself to black-and-white analysis, that the choice among many unsatisfactory alternatives is delicate and difficult.

The students and faculty at the University of Colorado thus carried on the kind of forum owned.

The Dissenters

As a Berkeley speaker berated the government yesterday for its action in Vietnam, a common concern was reflected in faces from different generations, different worlds.

The Varsity
TORONTO
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MILLION HEAR U OF T TEACH-IN

The University of Toronto was the scene this Thanksgiving weekend of an historic confrontation between speakers from around the globe.

The International Teach-In on the theme of "Revolution"...
riage of an old ruling class, convinced that its way of life and its way of operating a national economy is the only rational and reasonable one, and that a new social order is in aberration. Since the beginning of history, declining social classes, ruling social classes, have ensured that the social system opposed to theirs couldn't possibly work. This is the secret of the illusions and the myths in which our ruling classes sincerely believe. And when some of these illusions are exploded, when the illusion about America's unchallengeable superiority was exploded, the reaction to it was equally irrational. A panic! Waves of panic spread over the whole West. And now, when it turns out that even backward China, the China that was kicked around and tramped upon by the West for a century, that even backward China develops its nuclear industry, we hear those panicky and insane voices that tell us that perhaps if a few bombs are dropped on China's nuclear installations, the growth of this giant will be properly interrupted at the right time. Quite apart from the wickedness, quite apart from the profound inhumanity and immorality of such talk—which I would still like to hope does not affect or reflect official American policy—I am not sure that it doesn't—quite apart from that, what a nonsensical illusion it is, that by dropping a few bombs you can really stop the growth, the industrial growth and modernization, of the greatest nation in the world. Once again, arrogance—incridible, fathomless arrogance—and wishful thinking combine to produce something that future historians will cite as examples of the degeneration of the human mind.

The next set of assumptions of the cold war is that Communism is subversion alone... But what if all the talk about Moscow-inspired subversion was hollow? Behind the talk there was one major assumption to which our ruling classes and our governments cling to this day: the assumption that, whether subversion threatened or not, our ruling classes were really and merely frightened of revolution. They are much more frightened of the revolutions behind which there are no intrigues of any great powers, behind which there is no Russian hand and no Chinese hand. The more a revolution is spontaneous, the more it develops by its own momentum, the more are our ruling classes frightened of it. They have assumed the role of the gendarmes, of counter-revolution, and this is the root of all the trouble we are having. They are the belated 20th-century Metternichs. You know that Metternich was that famous Austrian statesman who after the defeat of Napoleon sought to preserve feudalism in Europe and to suppress all revolution, until he was overthrown in 1848. These are our Metternichs. And they, of course, say that they are struggling against subversion, and they are struggling against it by economic aid, by the generosity also of Marshall aid and so on. Even recently we have heard how the Vietnamese were offered economic aid, but if they didn't behave well, if they didn't respond immediately to the offer, then the bombings were resumed. Either you take my economic aid or I bomb you. There is a nice German verse which I shall perhaps translate into English, which says: "Und willst du nicht mein Bruder sein, da schlag ich dir den Schadel ein." "And if you don't want"—in my free amateurish English translation I would put it—"and if you don't want to be my brother and pal, then I am going to smash your wicked skull."...

Now we have seen in so many cases the impotence of the containment policy, of the anti-communist containment policy. The policy has proved impotent simply because no weapons, no armed intervention, no napalm bombing, can really stop a revolution which is rooted in the faith and in the suffering and in the experience of its own people and of its own working masses...

I still believe that class struggle is the motive force of history. But in this last period, class struggle has all too often sunk into a bloody morass of power politics. On both sides of the great divide, a few ruthless and half-witted oligarchies—capitalist oligarchies here, bureaucratic oligarchies there—hold all the power and make all the decisions, obfuscate the minds and throttle the wills of the nations. They even reserve for themselves the roles of the chief protagonists and expound for us the great conflicting ideas of our time. The social struggles of our time have degenerated into the unscrupulous contests of the oligarchies. Official Washington speaks for the world's freedom, while official Moscow speaks for the world's socialism. All too long the peoples failed to contradict these false friends, either of freedom or of socialism. On both sides of the great divide the peoples have been silent too long and have thus willy-nilly identified themselves with the policies of their governments. The world has thus come very close, dangerously close, to a division between revolutionary and counter-revolutionary nations. This to my mind has been the most alarming result of the cold war. Fortunately, things have begun to change. The Russian people have been shaken off the old conformism and have been regaining a critical attitude towards their rulers. Things are also changing here in the United States, as I, who was here 15 years ago, can see perhaps more clearly than you young people. They are changing because the world, after all, is something like a system of interconnected vessels where the level of freedom and critical thinking tends to even out. I am sure that without the Russian de-Stalinisation there would not have been this amount of freedom and critical thinking that there is in America today. And I am also sure that your continued exercise of freedom and continued voicing of criticism and of critical political action will encourage the further progress of freedom in the communist part of the world. Freedom in the Soviet Union was suppressed and stifled during the rise of Stalinism mostly. This was the time of the great purges. Then it was stifled again and trampled over again throughout the cold war or most of the cold war. The more you exercise your freedom, the more will the Russians feel encouraged to speak up also critically against the mistakes and blunders of their government.

We may not be able to get away from the severe conflicts of our age and we need not get away from them. But we may perhaps for the time being lift those conflicts above the bloody morass into which they have been forced. The division may perhaps once again run within nations rather than between nations. And once the divisions begin to run within nations, progress begins anew, the progress towards the only solution of our problems, not of all perhaps our problems, but of the critical political problems and social problems, the only solution, which is a socialist world, one socialist world. We must, we can and we must, give back to class struggle its old dignity. We may and we must restore meaning to the great ideas, partly conflicting ideas, by which mankind is still living: the ideas of liberalism, democracy, and communism—yes, the idea of communism.

V. DOCUMENTS (see page 11)

VI. REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READING


We Accuse (Berkeley, Calif.: Diablo Press, 1965). The Vietnam Day Committee’s compilation of 16 complete addresses delivered at the Berkeley teach-in.


VII. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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